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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GAYDON ELLIOTT WINGER,
Plaiuti ff,
-vs lliSURANCECOMPANYOFNORTH
AMERICA,
Defendant, Third Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.
11323

- VS -

L. A. BOWEN, d/b/a L. A. BOWEN
INSURANCE, INC.,
Third Party Defendant
and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment snit brought by the
plaintiff to obtain a judicial declaration that defendant
Insurance Company of North America furnished prof essional liability insurance to the plaintiff at the time of
an accident which occurred on or about August 9, 1966,
at approximately 6 :00 o'clock P.M. Defendant filed a
third party action against third party defendant Bowen,
its former agent, seeking a judicial declaration that if
defendant was liable to plaintiff that third party defendant was liable over to defendant and third party
plaintiff.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring that plaintiff was insured for professional liability by defendant
at the time and place of the accident. The court denied
relief to defendant and third party plaintiff, holding that
it was not entitled to recover owr against third party
defendant agent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, third party plaintiff and appellant seeks
a reversal of that portion of the judgment denying relief
to it on its third party complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

It should be noted at the outset that the record
consists of one volume of papers and plt>adings filed in
the action numbered consecutively from 1 to 94; a transe;ript of the proceedings at trial separately numbered
from 1 to 292; and an envelope of exhibits not numbered
except by their exhibit number at the trial. References
to the first volume will be prefaced by the letter "R",
references to the transcript will be prefaced by "Tr.";
and references to the exhihits will be prefaced by "Ex."
and the exhibit number. In this brief we shall refer to
the plaintiff as he appeared in the court below, to defondant and third party plaintiff Insurance Company of
North America as INA, and to third party defendant as
Bowen.
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Although two full days were taken in presenting evidence, there was very little dispute in the facts. Under
familiar principles, on this appeal we treat the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties, and
accept the court's findings of fact, except where certain
findings are inconsistent or where they are unsupported
by any evidence. We believe that the facts can be most
easily understood by a chronological presentation:
Plaintiff entered the practice of his profession of
dentistry in Utah County in the year 1960. At that time,
he obtained from the Cordner Agency, predecessor in
interest of Bowen, a

polic~'

of professional liability insur-

ance written in IN A, with an inception date of August 9,
1960, for a term of one year. (Tr. 32; Ex. 1). After the
initial purchase of insurance, he renewed the policy annually thereafter through the Cordner Agency until that
agency was acquired by Bowen in 1962. (Exs. 1-3). The
practice was, that approximately one month before the
expiration of the policy term, the agency would send
plaintiff a renewal request form, which he would sign
and return, and a renewal policy would thereafter be
issued. After Bowen acquired the Cordner Agency in
1962, he became licensed as an agent for INA, and he
continued to serve plaintiff for purposes of professional
liability insurance and continued to renew the policies
in the same fashion. (Exs. 4-7; Tr. 35, 52-53, 56, 119, 139).
The last policy was dated August 9, 1965, with an expiration date of 12 :01 A.M. August 9, 1966. (Ex. 7).
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During the last policy year, Bowen's agency agreement with INA was cancelled. Bowen at first testified
that the termination occurred in Jnly of 1966. (Tr. 115).
However, after being confronted with Ex. ~4, a letter
written to him by the manager of IN A's Salt Lake Service
Office, dated December 16, l 965, he concluded that he
was in error and that the agency termination occurred
on or about December 16, 1965. (Tr. 140, 145, 166, 167-168,
1G9). The records of IN A established December 16, 1965,
as the closing date of the agency (Ex. 25) and this was
also the testimony of Merlin Perkins, who at the time
of the incident here involved was a field representative
of INA in its Salt Lake Office. (Tr. 223, 224, 228). The
evidence is without dispute that the termination of the
agency occurred before the time Bowen attempted to
renew the Winger policy. (Tr. 162).
Under the agreement for termination of the agency,
Bowen was permitted to continue to service INA policies
still in force up to the time of their respective expiration
dates. In this connection, he was permitted to countersign endorsements to the policies, etc. (Tr. 147, 224).
However, he had no authority to bind the company for
any additional, new or renewal liability. He was also
required to surrender his agency contract, policy forms,
and other company supplies, and he did so. (Tr. 144,
145, 229-230). The exact terms of the termination agreement as set forth in Ex. 2-1 are as follows:
"In accordance with the provisions of the Agency Agreement between your agency and the
Insurance Company of North America, we wish to

!
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advise that we are termiuating your appointment
effective December lG, 19G5. You are however
granted by this letter, limited authority to perform snch acts as may be necessarv for the convenience of all parties intt•rested in. the continued
administration of outstanding policies issued during the representation of your agency. Your
acceptance and retention of agency license for this
Company is considered as acceptance of the limited authority granted by this letter.
"Snbject to acceptance by the Company, you
are authorized to issne and conntersign endorsements to outstanding policies originally issued as
above. Any additional premiums involved will be
paid to the Company.
"This limited aitthority does not include the
binding of the Company for any additional, new
or renewal liability. Snch authority may be terminated by either party on written notice to the
other and shall automatically terminate if the license is not maintained, or upon expiration of the
last remaining policy now upon the books." (Emphasis ours.)
'l'hat Bowen understood that he had no right to bind
coverage in INA and conld not renew INA policies is
abundantly clear from his own testimony as follows:

"Q. But you did not have the right to make renewals 1
A. No.
Q. And yon understood that?
A. I knew I could not order a renewal from IN A.
Q. You knew you could not bind coverage of IN A,
didn't you~
A. Yes." (Tr. 147, Lines 17-25).
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Neither INA nor Bowen gave any notice to the plain. ,
tiff of the termination of Bowen's agency. (Tr. 48, 55,

119, 238, 290). On or about July 7, 1966, in accordance
with the previous practice, but without any authority
whatsoever, Bowen sent to the plaintiff a renewal request
form for the renewal of the expiring professional liability
policy. (Ex. 14, Tr. 38-39, 118). The request did not
specifically indicate that the renewal policy would be
placed in INA but did show INA as the carrier on the
expiring policy and referred to it by policy number.
(Ex. 14). Bowen was at this time a licensed agent of
several other companies, including U.S.F.&G. Company,
in which he had binding authority. (Tr. 138, 163).
rrhe plaintiff took no immediate action with respect
to the renewal request and approximately a week before
the expiration date, another copy of the renewal request
was sent to plaintiff. (Tr. 40, 127). According to the
testimony of the plaintiff and his wife, the original renewal request was signed by plaintiff and mailed back
to Bmven with a check covering the amount of the premium on the afternoon of August 8, 1966. (Tr. 41, 76).
Although there was evidence casting doubt upon the mailing date, the court believed the testimony of plaintiff and
his wife, and found that the renewal request was mailed
on August 8, 1966, before the expiration of the last policy. (R. 63). The check was deposited by Bowen to his
account and subsequently used to purchase a professional
liability policy for plaintiff in U.S.F. & G. Company.
(Tr. 69).
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On the afternoon of August 9, 1966, at about 6 :00
o'clock PM., and about eighteen hours after the last policy
had expired, plaintiff had an accident in treating a child
patient, whereby a dental instrument penetrated her eye,
causing her.injury. (Tr. 43, R. 70). HO"wever, no notice
thereof was given to Bowen or to INA until several days
thereafter. (Tr. 66, 84-, 156, 157, 237, 245).
Bowen testified that he received the renewal request
and check on August 10, 1966, (Tr. 125, 151) and the
court so found. ( R. 69-70). On the same date, he submitted a memorandum to Rulon 1\Ieyers, a licensed agent
of INA, with whom he had no personal acquaintanc<>,
(Tr. 191-192) requesting him to renew the expired policy.
(Tr. 152, Ex. 26). He knew that he had no authority
to renew the coverage, and for that reason sought to
broker it through a licensed agent of INA. (Tr. 119, 153).
He also knew that Meyers was under no obligation to
renew the policy if he did not wish to do so. (Tr. 154).
Although Meyers could have bound coverage in INA
for plaintiff, he did not do so. Instead, when Meyers
n~ceived Bo,vt;n's request for renewal, he wrote a memorandum to Merlin Perkins at INA's Salt Lake Service
Office requesting a renewal. (Tr. 231, Ex. 39). The
memorandum was dated August 12, 1966, and bears IN A's
"received stamp" showing receipt on August 15, 1966.
( 'l1r. 232, Ex. 39). Perkins testified that he called Meyers
on the same date and advised him that INA would be
1m\\rilling to renew the business unless it received the
supporting business of the plaintiff. (Tr. 236-237).
MPyPrs asked Pt>rkins to confirm this in writing, and
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Perkins endorsed the information on the same memorandum and returned it to Meyers on the same day. (Tr.
236, 237; Ex. 39). Meyers then endorsed onto the memorandum a note to his secretary to call and advise that
he could not place the insurance. (Tr. 278, Ex. 39).
Meyers did not have personal knowledge as to whether
his secretary actually made the call. (Tr. 279). Up to
this time, Perkins had no knowledge whatsoever of am
potential claim and there is no evidence that any officer,
agent, or employee of INA had any knowledge that plaintiff had had an accident or would be presenting a claim.
(Tr. 236, 237).
Some days after the accident, Mrs. Winger called
Bowen's office and first sought to obtain a copy of plaintiff's policy. (Tr. 83-84). At a later time, she advised
Bowen that her husband had had an accident. (Tr. 84-85,
156). Bowen told her that her husband should make a
written report of the accident and deliver it to him. (Tr.
85, 157). According to the testimony of Mrs. Winger,
her husband prepared a written report that night and
she delivered it to Bowen's office the next day. (Tr. 85).
Bowen testified that on the same day that he received
the statement, he transmitted it to Kenneth Ross, customer service representative of INA at its Salt Lake
office. (Tr. 157; Exs. 20, 27). The letter of transmittal
hears the date of August 20 and INA's "received stamp"
of August 22. The statement of plaintiff also bears
INA's "received stamp" of Augnst 22. (Exs. 20, 27). The
receipt of this letter from Bowen was IN A's first knowledge of any claim of loss. (Tr. 245, Ex. 27).
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Mr. Ros::; commenced an investigation of the accident
the following day, August 23, by interviewing Dr. Winger
and obtaining a signed statement from him (Tr. 46);
calling at Bowen's office to obtain necessary policy information (Tr. 248); and then interviewing the father of
the injured child. (Tr. 256). The next morning when
Ross returned to his Salt Lake office and checked the
policy information against a specimen form of the policy,
he discovered that the accident had occurred after the
expiration date of the policy. (Tr. 249, 257). He promptly
notified Bowen of this fact, and a few days later (August
27 to August 30), Ross and Bowen met with the Wingers,
and Ross advised them that the policy had expired and
that INA had declined to renew it for underwriting
reasons, and therefore there was no coverage. (Tr. 47-48,
GS, 135, 158, 159, 249, 250-251).
Shortly thereafter, this action was cormnenced on
behalf of plaintiff for a declaratory judgment to the effect
that INA covered the accident in question and was obligated to defend any suit cormnenced against plaintiff
by the injured patient. (R. 3-5). INA impleaded Bowen
as a third party defendant, contending that if INA had
any liability to the plaintiff, it was only as a result of
the unauthorized acts of Bowen in attempting to bind or
renew coverage in INA after his agency agreement had
been terminated. (R. 10-13).
The trial judge concluded that since no notice had
eyer been given to the plaintiff of the termination of
Howpn's agency, that Bowen had apparent or ostensible
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authority to renew policies in INA, and that since the
\Vingers had mailed the renewal request before the expiration date of the expiring poliry, that coverage was
renewed. ( R. 53, 62, 64, 69). The court also found, contrary to all of the evidence, that so far as plaintiff's application for renewal ·was concerned, that Bowen was an
agent for INA and, likewise without any evidence whatsoever, concluded that INA had ratified the acts of
Bowen. (R. 71, 72). The evidence was undisputed that
Bowen's agency agreement had been terminated many
months before the transaction here involved, as hereinabo\-e fully demonstrated. In fact, Bowen's counsel so
admitted in his opening statement. ('l'r. 16). As soon
as INA received a request for renewal of the Winger
policy, it was promptly rejected, although IN A then had
no knowledge of a possible claim. As soon as INA discovered that the accident occurred after the expiration
time of its prior policy, it promptly advised plaintiff that
there was no coverage. There was no evidence whatsoever of any ratification.
INA filed seasonable objections to the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, motion to a11wnd
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and motion for
new trial (R. 77-80), all of which were overruled and
denied (R. 85-86), and this appeal followed. (R. 87).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND

1
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A GA I N ST DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY
PLAINTIFF, AND AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF INA IS
E N T IT LE D TO JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT BOWEN IF PLAINTIFF IS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER AGAINST INA.

The general rule with regard to the liability of an
insurance agent to his principal company is set forth in
4-4 C.J.S. 834, Insurance, Section 159:
"An insurance agent is liable in damages for
any loss sustained by the company arising from
the agent's breach of duty ... Thus, if the agent
issnes a policy in violation of his instructions, he
will be liable to the company for the amount of
loss which it has been compelled to pay on such
policy, together with expenses incurred in connection therewith, ... " (Emphasis ours.)
'l'o the same effect is 29 Am.Jur. 557-8, Insurance, Section
159:
"In so far as the insurance company is concerned, an insurance agent must act in good faith,
confine his acts within the scope of his actual
authority, obey his principal's instructions, and
use due care and reasonable diligence in the transaction of the business entrusted to him. The agent
is, as a general rule, liable to the company for
the losses resulting proximately from a failure in
or departure from such duties. Although an insurance agent may within his apparent or ostensible authority bind the company to risks which his
instructions forbid him to assume, he is liable to
the company if he issues a policy in violation of
his instructions and thereby subjects the company
to a liability which it has forbidden him to assume
for it. In such case, the agent is liable to the
company for the amount of insurance paid and
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expenses incurred by the c01npan)' on account of a
loss undtir the policy, and he cannot ddcat a re.
covery by showing that the company might have
escaped liability on the policy b)· litigation, at
least if it appears that the company paid the lo"
in good faith to avoid it, and would have been
taking chances of incurring further liability by
resorting to it." (l~mphasis ours.)
See also Coitch on Insurance 2d, Section 26:350:
"If an agent for an insurance company receives clear and explicit instructions from his principal with respect to mattPrs delegatPd to him,
he must exercise good faith and reasonable diligence in the execution of such orders, under penalty of liability to his employer for any loss resulting from a departure from, or failure to so carry
out, such instructions. Converi'wly, the agent has
no right to weigh the wisdom or expediency of the
instructions ginn him and to disobey them bc'causc he does not deem them proper.
"As illustrations of thesP principles, the agent
of an insurer is liable to it for loss occasioned the
insitrer becaiise the agent has issued a policy contrary to instrnctions, insured a prohibited risk,
issued a policy in excess of a spticified maximum,
or failed to cancel a policy." (Emphasis ours.)
Our research has failed to discover a single case like
the case at bar, wherein an agent whose writing authority
has been cancelled has att0mpted to renew an expiring·
policy in the same company. HmvPver, if a dnly licensed
agent is liable to his compan.Y for violation of instructions
for failure to cancPl a policy, or to reduce the amount
of coverage, or for writing a prohibited risk, it would
St·em a fortiori that he must b(' liahl<> to the company if

13
he causes it to incur a liability by acting wholly beyond
the scope of his actual authority. The reasoning of the
courts in the following cases is persuasive:
Manufactitrers Casualty Insu.rance Co. v. Martin
Lebreton Insurance Agency, 242 F.2d 951:

"The law is well settled: that an agent owes
to his principal the obligation of high fidelity; that
he may not proceed without, or beyond his authority, particu.larly were he has been forbidden to
act; and that, if so proceeding, his actions cause
loss to the. principal, the agent is fully accountable to the principal therefor. (Emphasis ours.)
"Under the undisputed facts . . . and the
settled law applicable thereto, unless and until the
principal, with full knowledge of all the applicable
facts, waived the breach of his instructions and
adopted the agent's act, in writing the bond, as
its own the agent became and remained liable to
the principal for the damages resulting from its
assuming to act to the disadvantage of its principal without authority. . . .

* * *

"The case was not tried and determined on
its facts. Instead, it was determined as a matter
of law and without a trial on the incorrect assumption that, notwithstanding the agent's admitted
and grievous breach of its duty, it could escape
the loss and throw it on its principal upon the
mere claim that the principal did not immediately
repu.diate the bond. [Sic] The law is not so written."
American Fire and Marini? Insitrance Company vs.
81?ymo1tr, (La. App.), 144 So. 775:
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In this case, defendant agent wrote two pol1c1es in direct violation of written instructions
from the home office of the plaintiff company, and
·was held liable to the plaintiff for the losses sustained. The court said:
"Nowhere in their brief do counsel for the
appellant discuss the question of the liability of
an insurance agent for the loss incurred b;; an
insurance company through the unanthorized issuance of a policy by the agent. We presume that
liability is conceded in such a case. Counsel for
plaintiff discusses this question in a most illuminating manner in their brief, but since the point
appears to be conceded, and, since the question of
the liability of an agent for unauthorized issuance
is so elemental, we refrain from any discussion or
further reference to that feature of the case.''
U. S. Casitalty Cmnpany vs. Hiers, 233 S.C. 333, 10-:1

SE2d 561:

"It is well settled by general rule that failure
of an agent of an insurer to comply with the
instructions of the latter, whereby loss to it results, is liable over to the insurer."

To the same effect, see Phoenix Insurance Company vs.
Sccgers, 192 Ala. 103, 68 So. 902; Queen City Fire Ins1tra11cc Company vs. First National Bank of Hannaford,
18 N.D. 603, 120 N.W. 505; Franklin Fire Insurance Company vs. Bradford, 201 Pa. 32, 50 A. 286; Insurance Company of North Amcrica vs. Baer, (Kan.), 147 P. 840;
National Union Fire Insitrancc Company of Pittslnirg vs.
Dickinson, ("Wash.), 159 P. 125.
One aspect of this general rule is wc~ll illustrated in
the annotation of 106 ALR at 1379, Liauility of Insurance
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Agent to Insnrer Because of Failure to Ca11cel or Reduce
Risk. The rule is there stated as follows:

"If an insurance company ... directs its agent
to cancel or reduce [the risk], it is his dutv to do
so with reasonable promptness, and if h~ negligently or wilfully fails to carry out peremptory
instructions to cancel or reduce he is liable to the
insurer for the amount which it is required to pay
in settlement of the loss."

The most similar Utah case which our research has
discovered is Phoenix Insurance Compm1y vs. Heath,
(Utah), 61 P.2d 308. This court there said:

"It is undoubtedly the law that, where an
insurance company under the terms of the policy
of insurance is entitled to cancel the policy or
reduce its amount, it may direct its agent to cancel
or reduce and it is the duty of such agent forthwith to do so, and, if he negligently delays in
obeying his instructions and loss occurs thereby,
he is liable to the insurer for the amount it is
required to pay in settlement of the loss. * * *
"Defendants do not question the rule of law
above stated, but attempt to relieve themselves
from liability for the delay by saying they had a
right to ask the company for a reconsideration
of its demand and that the letter of the 16th from
the company to the agents in reply to the agents'
letter of November 13th is a recognition of the
right to ask for a reconsideration and is a waiver
of the delay up to that time and that they had a
reasonable time, that is, three to five days, in
which to comply with the request for reduction
after the receipt of the second letter. The loss
having already occurred before receipt of the
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letter, the question of reasonable time is imma.
terial and that they are not liable for the delay.
"It may be conceded that def Pndants had a
right to ask for reconsidt>ration of the peremptory
order to reduce the amount of insurance, but,
where such request is made under the circmnstances as sho-..vn by this record, the question still
remains whether the delay thereby occasioned \YR>
at the risk of the agents or at the risk of the
principal. * * *
"It would seem to follow from the plaintiff',
instructions to its agents and the law as announced
in the cases referred to that defendants were under
the duty to promptly reduce the amount of the
policy according to the positive directions of their
principal and that the delay in so doing was at
their own risk."
CONCLUSION
Defendant INA's liability to plaintiff arises solrly
out of the unauthorized and wrongful acts of third party
defendant Bowen in holding himself out as a licensed
agent of INA, authorized to renew policies of insurance
in that company. Since defendant has incurred liability
to the plaintiff by reason of such wrongful acts, defendant INA is entitled to judgment over against third party
defendant whose wrongful and unlawful conduct created
the liability.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, ·utah
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